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Abstract: This paper studies the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts 
and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. Utilizing a revenue sharing contract menu 
design model for dual-channel supply chains under asymmetric cost information based on 
principal-agent theory and presenting an optimal decision model under full information for 
comparison with asymmetric information, an optimal contract is conceived for the 
manufacturer, and the impact of asymmetric information on the performance of the partners 
and the whole supply chain is analysed. The study determines that the direct sale price does not 
change while the retail sale price increases and retail demand decreases. Information 
asymmetry degrades the performance for the manufacturer and the whole supply chain, while 
retailers can benefit from asymmetric information. The performance for the manufacturer, the 
retailer and the whole supply chain can be improved if the condition that the retailer shares 
cost information can be met. Finally, numerical examples are adopted to verify our analytical 
findings and gain more insights into the optimal policies. 
Key Words: E-commerce; supply chain management; dual-channel; information asymmetry; 
revenue sharing contract; game theory. 
1. Introduction 
The dual-channel structure has increased in popularity for the sale of products, 
combining the direct sale channel with the traditional retail channel (Cai, 2010). Over the last 
few years, due to the rapid growth of E-commerce and the third-party logistics enterprises, 
many manufacturers (such as Nike, Sony, Hewlett Packard, Dell and Lenovo) have started 
selling their products directly to their customers (Chen et al., 2012). The manufacturers 
benefit from a web-based direct channel, since it helps the manufacturers in cost saving, 
increasing sale revenue, expanding new market segments and avoiding retailer domination 
(Huang et al., 2012). The direct sale has also changed customers’ purchase patterns. 
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Consequently, an increasing number of manufacturers have redesigned their sale structures by 
adopting direct sales to satisfy different customers’ purchasing preferences because the 
traditional retail channel was not able to meet their requirements (Cai, 2010). However, the 
manufacturer faces direct competition from the retailer in a dual-channel supply chain (Samar 
et al., 2008). Performance issues regarding the dual-channel supply chain have evoked 
considerable interest from both academicians and practitioners (Chiang et al., 2003). 
Theoretically, channel coordination can yield greater profit to partners and alleviate channel 
conflicts (Cachon, 2003). 
However, in practice the supply chain partners’ information regarding items such as raw 
material costs, labour costs and so on is confidential, and obtaining full information about a 
partner’s production cost may be difficult or impossible (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Samar, 
et al., 2008). The extant literature has barely addressed the issue of dual-channel supply chain 
coordination under asymmetric information, which motivates us to ask the following research 
questions: How to alleviate the channel conflict by a contract in the dual-channel supply chain? 
How does information asymmetry affect partners’ prices, profits and overall supply chain 
performance? We explore the asymmetric information case and the full information case with 
regard to alleviating channel conflicts by considering the contract design problem. We assess 
the impact of asymmetric information on each partner’s performance by comparing 
differences in profit levels under both the full information case and the asymmetric 
information case. 
In this paper, we present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to 
alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a 
revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost 
information conditions, based on the principal-agent model (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Lei 
et al., 2012; Volodymyr et al., 2012). In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract 
under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. Under the 
asymmetric information case, the manufacturer offers a lump sum side payment to the retailer 
to alleviate channel conflict. The paper illustrates the optimum prices and production quantity 
in each channel under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. 
The other main purpose of this study is to assess the impact of information sharing on the 
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performances of the manufacturer and the retailer by comparing the profit difference between 
the full information case and the asymmetric information case. The study ascertains the value 
of information for the partners, and the conditions under which partners are willing to share 
confidential information. 
The contributions of this study are threefold. Firstly, we model the optimum revenue sharing 
contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the 
asymmetric information case. Secondly, we contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel 
supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Thirdly, 
we explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel 
supply chain and investigate the information value. 
This study provides some interesting observations. First, the direct sale price is unchanged 
and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the 
price sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information 
asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, 
information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the 
manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply 
chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply 
chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump 
sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to 
sharing this information. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the published 
relative literature. In Section 3, we briefly describe the model set up, including the optimal 
contracts under asymmetric information based on the principal-agent theory in Section 3.1, 
and the optimal contract under full information in Section 3.2. Section 4 discusses the value 
of information sharing. In Section 5, the numerical examples with analytical results are 
presented. We conclude the results and limitations in Section 6. 
2. Related Work 
This paper addresses the intersection of the dual-channel supply chain and information 
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asymmetry. The related literatures, including those on dual-channel supply chain, revenue 
sharing contract and information asymmetry are reviewed and analysed in this section. 
Channel competition and the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain have 
received increasing attention in the past few years. However, the competition of a 
dual-channel may lead to channel conflicts and inefficiency. The determination and adoption 
of effective methods to enhance the performance of the dual-channel supply chain have 
become interesting topics for both academicians and practitioners (Chiang et al., 2003). 
Theoretically, channel coordination can yield greater profits to partners and alleviate channel 
conflicts (Cachon, 2003). Studies of channel structures have experienced growing popularity 
in recent years. Chiang et al. (2003) finds that retailers also benefit from the direct channel by 
decreasing a wholesale price when considering a price-setting game between retail and direct 
channels. Swaminathan and Tayur (2003) reviews relevant analytical models and discusses 
the strengths and limitations of different models in dual supply chains. Yao and Liu (2003) 
examine the customer diffusion between two channels and point out that both channels have 
stable demands under certain conditions. Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) studies the pricing and 
service quality models in a dual-channel supply chain. Yan (2008) studies the optimal prices 
decision model based on game theory in dual-channel supply chains. Cai (2010) discusses the 
influences of different channel structures and channel coordination on the profits of supply 
chain partners and the system as a whole. Hua et al. (2010) compares the optimal delivery 
lead time and prices under a centralized decision case and a decentralized decision case in a 
dual-channel supply chain. Dan et al. (2012) compares the optimal price between centralized 
decision making and decentralized decision making, and presents a coordination strategy. 
However, studies on contracts that provide insights on how to coordinate a dual-channel 
supply chain are limited. Chen et al. (2012) investigates a manufacturer’s pricing strategies in 
a dual-channel supply chain, and finds that a wholesale price contract and a direct channel 
price can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel.  
Over the last two decades, researches on supply chain coordination have gained much 
attention from academicians and practitioners. Contracts with various coordination 
mechanisms are widely used in supply chain coordination (Cachon, 2003). A revenue sharing 
contract is beneficial to manufacturers, retailers and other participants in a supply chain (Lei 
5 
 
et al., 2012). Wang et al. (2004) studies the channel performance of supply chains under 
consignment contract with revenue sharing, finding that the performance of the overall 
channel as well as individual firms critically depends on demand price elasticity and the 
retailer’s share of channel cost, and that a decentralized supply chain cannot be coordinated. 
Li and Hua (2008) extend the work of Wang et al. (2004) and provide a cooperative game 
model that implements revenue sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer to ensure 
cooperation. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) study revenue-sharing contracts in a two-echelon 
distribution channel with competing retailers, finding that in an extended setting where the 
market demand is both stochastic and retail price sensitive, only one revenue sharing contract 
can coordinate the channel. Yao et al. (2008) investigate a revenue-sharing contract for 
coordinating a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers, assuming 
demands from these two competing retailers to be independent and that all parties know their 
demand distributions at the beginning of the season, but they do not consider asymmetric 
information. Yao et al. suggest that the revenue-sharing contract has better performance than a 
wholesale price-only contract. None of these studies consider the revenue sharing contract for 
coordinating the dual-channel supply chain. In this paper, we consider not only pricing 
decisions but also the issue of coordination in a dual-channel supply chain under the 
asymmetric information case and the full information case. 
Information asymmetry in the supply chain is another aspect closely related to this study. 
Information asymmetry has attracted increasing attention in the past few years (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002; Lei et al., 2012; Volodymyr et al., 2012). Information asymmetry is very 
common in the supply chain and has received substantial attention recently (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002; Samar, et al., 2008). Laffont and Martimort (2002) study the incentives 
theory based on the principal-agent model. Charles et al. (2004) study the wholesale price 
contracts design problem under cost information asymmetry and make a comparison with full 
information. Samar et al. (2008) examine the information sharing of value-adding retailers in 
a dual-channel hi-tech supply chain, based on the Stackelberg game. Volodymyr et al. (2012) 
investigate a buyback contract design problem under demand information asymmetry. 
Cakanyildirim et al. (2012) study the contract design and coordination problems under 
asymmetric production of cost information in a one-supplier and one-retailer supply chain 
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where the supplier has type-dependent reservation profit. 
To the best of our knowledge, the revenue sharing contract design problem in a 
dual-channel supply chain has not so far been considered. There are several differences 
between our model and the above papers. Firstly, we consider a revenue sharing contract to 
alleviate the channel conflict under the cases of asymmetric information and full information. 
Furthermore, unlike Cai (2010) and other dual-channel pricing and coordination research, we 
investigate the influences of information asymmetry on prices, production quantities and 
profits. 
3. The Model 
We examine a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a direct sale channel in addition to the 
traditional retail channel, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The 
manufacturer may sell the products to the retailer, and may also sell the products to end 
customers directly. Thus, in a way, the retailer and the manufacturer compete on prices in the 
end customer market.  




p  respectively. This 
price competition between the direct channel and the retailer can be modelled as differentiated 
Bertrand competition (Chen et al., 2012). We assume that there is only one product for sale in 
the end market (Huang et al., 2012). The retailer is charged the wholesale price w by the 
manufacturer. Let 
mc  equal the unit cost of manufacturer in direct channel and rc  the unit 
cost of retailer in the retail channel. The manufacturer and retailer are considered as playing a 
Stachelberg game, where the manufacturer acts as a leader and a retailer as a follower (Huang 
et al., 2012). We considered two cases regarding the retailer’s costs: the full information case, 
where the manufacturer knows exactly rc ; and the asymmetric information case, where the 
manufacturer only knows that there are two types of retail selling costs: the high cost 
rc with 
probabilityθ and the low cost 
r
c with probability1-θ . To facilitate the analysis, following 
Yue and Liu (2006), Chen et al., (2012), Huang et al, (2012), we assume that the end market 
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demand for the two channels is formulated as follows: 









D are the demands in the retail channel and the direct channel 
respectively. Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) indicate that the each channel’s demand, linearly depends on 
the retail price
r
p and the direct sale price
d
p , a  is the base potential demand, capturing the 
effects of all variables not considered in our model. The demand share of the direct channel is
ρ and the rest 1 ρ− represents the demand share in the retail channel when the products are 
free of charge, ρ reflects the end customer’s preference for the direct channel (Chen et al., 
2012). 
1α  and 2α  respectively represent the coefficients of self-price sensitiveness of the 
demand 
r
D  and 
d
D , which means that this is the reduction from the base demand per unit 
self-price increase. β  is the coefficient of cross-price sensitivity, which reflects the degree 
of competition between the two channels and the migration rate if customers perceive that 
there is a difference between the retail price
r
p and the direct sale price 
d
p  (Huang et al., 




p w≥ . Otherwise, the retailer will prefer to obtain products 
from the direct channel. In order to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, we primarily 
investigate a revenue sharing contract ),( φw  in which the retailer obtains the product from 
the manufacturer with wholesale price w  and shares φ−1  percentage of its revenue with 
the manufacturer.  
With the above assumptions and notations, the retailer’s profit function is determined by 
( )= p -w-c Dr r r rπ φ ,                                                    (3) 
The manufacturer’s profit function is determined by 
( )= (1- )p +w +(p -c )Dm r r d m dDπ φ ,                                       (4) 
And the dual-channel supply chain’s joint profit function is 
= + =(p -c )D +(p -c )D
r m r r r d m d
π π π ,                                       (5) 
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3.1 The asymmetric information case 
In this study, it is assumed that the retailer has its own private information about its cost 
r
c  and has two cost states: a low state rc  and a high state rc . The retailer knows which of 
the two cost states will occur. Meanwhile the manufacturer has only a subjective assessment 
about the likelihood of the two cost states. The manufacturer only knows that the high cost 
rc with probabilityθ and the low cost rc with probability1-θ . Although the assumption 
regarding the two cost states is a simplification of the reality, these two-costs are sufficient to 
capture the major effect of information on contracting and competition. This type of 
asymmetric information has been commonly adopted in supply chain contracting or 
information screening literatures (for example, Laffont and Martimort, 2002; and 
Cakanyildirim et al., 2012) due to its parsimony and tractability for analysis. In this study, the 
manufacturer is an uninformed party that acts as a principal, and the retailer is treated as an 
agent that holds private information about its costs. We consider the revenue sharing contract 
design problem under asymmetric cost information. The goal of the manufacturer is to design 
a menu of revenue sharing contracts so as to maximize its expected profit based on the 
principal-agent model ( Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Lei et al., 2012; Volodymyr et al., 
2012 ).  
The decision procedure is as follows: (1) the retailer’s cost state is observed by the 
manufacturer; (2) the manufacturer offers a menu of revenue sharing contracts to the retailer
( ){ }, ,( , )w wφ φ ; (3) the retailer takes one of the contracts from the menu or leaves it; (4) if 
the retailer chooses to take one of the contracts, the manufacturer must sell rD ( rD ) units of 
product to the retailer at the wholesale price w ( w ), and gains φ−1  of sale revenue from the 
retailer. The manufacturer’s problem is how to set the menu of revenue sharing contracts to 
maximize its expected profit. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the retailer’s 
reservation profit is 0. Under asymmetric cost information, the manufacturer’s decision 
problem is presented as follows: 
( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,( , )
max = (1- ) + + - + 1- (1- ) + + -m r r d m d r r d m d
w w
p w D p c D p w D p c D
φ φ
π θ φ θ φ   
   
，         (6) 
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s.t.       ( )- - 0r r rp w c Dφ ≥ ，                                        (7) 
         ( )- - 0r r rp w c Dφ ≥  ，                                       (8) 
( ) ( )- - - -r r r r r rp w c D p w c Dφ φ≥ ，                             (9) 
( ) ( )- - - -r r r r r rp w c D p w c Dφ φ≥ ，                           (10) 
Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) are individual rationality constraints, they assure the retailer will join 
the dual-channel supply chain because its profit exceeds the reservation profit. Eq. (9) and Eq. 
(10) are incentive compatibility constraints, they force each type of the retailer to truly 
announce their type. 
From Eq. (7) and Eq. (10), Eq. (8) is always strictly satisfied. Thus we have 
( )- - =0r r rp w c Dφ ,                (11)  
( ) ( )- - = - -r r r r r rp w c D p w c Dφ φ ，                              (12) 
   Substituting (11) into (12), we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- - = - -  - - - = -r r r r r r r r r r r rp w c D p w c D p w c D c c Dφ φ φ ,    (13) 
Substituting Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) into Eq. (6), the manufacturer’s decision problem can 
be transformed to: 
( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,( , )
max = (1- ) + + - + 1- (1- ) + + -m r r d m d r r d m d
w w
p w D p c D p w D p c D
φ φ
π θ φ θ φ   
   
 
 = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )- + - + 1- - - - + -r r r d m d r r r r r r d m dp c D p c D p c D c c D p c Dθ θ        
= ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2- 1- - + + -c - +r r r d d m d rp c a p p p a p pθ ρ α β ρ α β     + 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 21- - 1- - + - - 1- - + + -c - +r r r d r r r d d m d rp c a p p c c a p p p a p pθ ρ α β ρ α β ρ α β     ,      (14) 
From Eq. (11) and Eq. (13), we can know that = -r rw p cφ  and ( )= - - -  rr r r r
r
D
w p c c c
D
φ . 
From the first order optimal condition of Eq. (14), when the retailer’s cost is high we derive 
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and the revenue share φ  should satisfy the following condition
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and the revenue share φ  must satisfy the condition
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3.2 The full information case 
Under full information, the manufacturer and retailer have full information about the 
dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraints Eq. (9) and Eq. 
(10) no longer work. Moreover, the individual rationality constraints Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) must 
both be binding at the optimal solution of the manufacturer’s problem. Thus the 
manufacturer’s problem can be transformed to the following equations: 
( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,( , )
max = (1- ) + + - + 1- (1- ) + + -
m r r d m d r r d m d
w w
p w D p c D p w D p c D
φ φ
π θ φ θ φ   
   
,               (17) 
s.t.     ( )- - 0r r rp w c Dφ = ，                                           (18) 
( )- - 0r r rp w c Dφ =                                              (19) 
So we can derive the optimal decisions under retailer’s high cost state: 
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   − − + − + − −
    


,         (21) 
By comparing the decisions under asymmetric information and full information, we can 
conclude the following. 
Theorem 1.  
(i) Comparing the optimal decisions when the retailer is in a high cost state and has full 
information, we have:  


















∗ > . 
(ii) Comparing the optimal decisions when the retailer is in a low cost state and has full 
information, we have: 
w w
∗ > ; *
r rp p= ,
*
d dp p= ; =r rD D
∗ , =d dD D
∗ , =D D∗ .  
Theorem 1 characterizes the impact of asymmetric cost information on the decisions of each 
channel partner in a dual-channel supply chain. We found that the direct sale price is 
unchanged and is independent of the retailer’s cost. Information asymmetry leads to higher 
wholesale price and a higher retail sale price, lower retail sale demand and total demand but 
higher direct sale demand when the retailer is in a high cost state. Moreover, when the retailer 
is in a low cost state, only the wholesale price is influenced by the absence of information, 
other variables remain steady, as under symmetric information; the influence of asymmetric 
information is limited. 
Theorem 2.  









+ > +r m r mπ π π π
∗ ∗
; 







+ = +r m r mπ π π π
∗ ∗
. 
The proof is straightforward and demonstrated by substituting the relevant optimal 
decisions into the manufacturer’s profit function and retailer’s profit function.  
Theorem 2 quantifies the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performances of 
partners in a dual-channel supply chain. From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we know that when 
the retailer’s cost is in a low state, the asymmetric information decreases the wholesale price, 
while other variables are steady, which leads to a decrease in the manufacturer’s profit, while 
the retailer gains a greater profit from the information advantage. When the retailer is in a 
high cost state, the manufacturer also suffers a reduction in profit, while the retailer achieves 
its reservation profit. So the asymmetric information is always beneficial to the retailer, while 
potentially harmful to the manufacturer’s profit.  
Therefore, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain will always gain at the cost of 
the retailer when the retailer’s cost information is shared. The manufacturer’s profit increment 
is not lower than the retailer’s reduction in profit. Therefore, the retailer is willing to share its 
information if the manufacturer can offer a lump sum side payment to the retailer to make up 
for the retailer’s profit loss. Theorem 2 illustrates that the dual-channel supply chain can 
achieve the coordination under asymmetric information if the manufacturer is willing to offer 
a lump sum side payment to the retailer in order to make up the retailer’s profit loss. The side 
payment the manufacturer offers should not be less than the profit difference between the 
asymmetric information case and the full information case. 
4. The value of information sharing 
Theorem 2 shows that the manufacturer may suffer profit loss when the retailer does not 
share cost information, while the retailer benefits from the asymmetric information and the 
retailer’s profit is not less than that under full information. The value of information sharing 
to the manufacturer (or retailer) is the profit difference from the asymmetric information case 
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to the full information case. The value of information sharing for an entity of the dual-channel 
supply chain is the difference between its optimal profits under full information and those 
under asymmetric information. What is the maximum amount the manufacturer is willing to 
spend for the retailer’s cost information? What is the condition that governs the retailer's 
motivation to share its private cost information (or not)? And what is the value of information 
sharing for the dual-channel supply chain?  
From Theorem 2, we know that the manufacturer's profit will always increase from the 
asymmetric information case to the full information case. The maximum amount the 
manufacturer is willing to spend for the retailer’s cost information should not more than the 
incremental profit that is obtained from the asymmetric information case to the full 
information case. The retailer may share its cost information if the payment that is paid by the 
manufacturer can make up for the retailer’s lost profit. The difference in the profit of the 
partners and that of the whole dual-channel supply chain between the full information case 
and the asymmetric information case can be thought of as the value of information sharing to 
the partners and the whole dual-channel supply chain. In order to quantify the value of 
information sharing to the manufacturer, we investigate the value of the asymmetric cost 
information from both the partners’ and whole system’s points of view. Now let us look at 
Theorem 3. 
 
Theorem 3.  
When the retailer’s cost information is shared, the value of information sharing to the 
manufacturer ∆πis positive. And the amount of increase in the manufacturer’s profit ∆πis 
















− − > 0,             (22) 
From Theorem 2, we know that the manufacturer obtains all the profit of the 
dual-channel supply chain under full information, while the retailer only obtains the 
reservation profit. Under asymmetric cost information, when the retailer is in a high cost state, 











due to the asymmetric cost 
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information, when the retailer is in a low cost state, the manufacturer has to pay the 
information rent ( )
r r r
c c D− to the retailer to compensate any loss due to the sharing of the 














− − . ∆π		  is the maximum amount that the 
manufacturer will be willing to spend for the information sharing, and the manufacturer offers 
∆π	to retailer by the lump sum side payment.  
From the retailer's point of view, it is possible that the retailer will stand to lose if the 
retailer shares its cost information with the manufacturer. The threshold value ( )
r r r
c c D− is 
the condition that induces the retailer to share its cost information. In addition, the profit 
difference for a retailer with a high cost state is 0 from the full information case to the 
asymmetric information case, in that the retailer earns only the reservation profit (0) under the 
high cost state and the full information case. However, the profit decreases ( )
r r r
c c D− for a 
retailer with a low cost state from the asymmetric information case to the full information 
case, so the value of information sharing for the retailer with a low cost state is ( )
r r r
c c D− − . 
This is because that retailer is dominated by the manufacturer, and the manufacturer 
maximizes its own profit via the information policy at the cost of a reduction in the retailer’s 
profit. This loss in profit ( )
r r r
c c D− can be compensated as an incentive from the 
manufacturer if the manufacturer pursues the retailer to share its cost information. 












Eq. (22) implies that the value of information sharing for the manufacturer increases with 
the range of the retailer’s cost, i.e. with
r r
c c− , and with the probability of retailer high costθ  
and the price sensitivity of retail sale demand, i.e., with
1
α . This means that the less certain 
the manufacturer is about the retailer’s cost information, the higher is the value of information 
sharing for the manufacturer. An important managerial insight obtained here is that the 
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manufacturer should decrease the predicted range about the retailer’s cost or improve the 
predicted precision accuracy about the retailer’s cost by using information technology and an 
incentive mechanism to collect the retailer’s cost information.  
Eq. (22) reveals some important findings. The advantages of information sharing to the 
manufacturer and the whole dual-channel supply chain are intuitive because information 
sharing helps the manufacturer make a better whole price decision and revenue sharing 
contract decision, which improves the performances of the partners and the whole system. 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the manufacturer and the whole supply chain can 
always increase profit if the retailer’s cost information is shared. If the payment charged to the 
manufacturer by the retailer is more than ( )
r r r
c c D− , the retailer is willing to share its cost 
information in that its profit is higher than that in the case that the information is not shared. 
An important managerial insight obtained here is that the manufacturer should actively pursue 
the retailer to share its cost information and pay the retailer as incentive for the information 
sharing. Thus sharing information can increase the profits of partners and the whole supply 
chain system, and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve a double win. 
Therefore, from the position of the manufacturer as a leader in dual-channel supply chain, 
sharing information by advanced information technology and management approaches in a 
dual-channel supply chain also can improve the profit of the manufacturer and the whole 
supply chain system.  
5. Numerical examples 
In this section, we use numerical examples to verify our analytical findings and gain further 
insights into optimal policies, especially for the varied exogenous parameters. We create an 
example where =0.4ρ , =200a , 1 =0.8α , 2 =1.2α , =0.6β . =15mc , =15rc , =20rc ,
=0.6θ . We derive the revenue share 0.4φ =  and 0.6φ = . Table 1 shows the results for 
both the full information case and the asymmetric information case in a dual-channel supply 
chain. From Table 1, we know that the direct sale price (120.833) is unchanged and 
independent of the retailer’s cost construct. When the retailer is in a high cost state, the 
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retailer price and wholesale price under the asymmetric information case are higher than those 
of the full information case. Moreover, when the retailer is in a low cost state, only the 
wholesale price is influenced by the unshared information, while the asymmetric information 
does not change direct demand, retailer demand or retailer price because these decision 
variables are independent of the probability of the cost state (θ ). From Table 1, we know that 
the profits of the manufacturer and the whole supply chain in the asymmetric case are lower 
than those in the full information case, while the retailer gains more profit in the asymmetric 
information case due to the advantage of information. We find that asymmetry of information 
is always beneficial to the retailer due to the advantage afforded them by their having full 
information, while decreasing the manufacturer’s profit and leading to a reduction in profit to 
the whole dual-channel supply chain. 
 





c   
r
p   
d





















c  171.667 120.833 48.667 55.1667 38 93.1667 0 12388.6 12388.6 
Low 
cost 
=15rc  167.5 120.833 80.78 58.5 35.5 94 275.8 12402.5 12678.3 
 
We plot the price and demand as a function of the cross-price sensitivity coefficients ( β ), as 
illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 when retailer is in a high cost state. We also plot the price 
and demand as a function of β , as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 when retailer’s cost is in a 
low state. Fig.1 and Fig.3 show that the prices always increase with β  increasing for both a 
high cost state and a low cost state, and a wholesale price lower than the direct sale price, 
which prevents the retailer from obtaining products from the direct channel.  
Fig.2 and Fig.4 show that the demand for both channels always increases with increasing 
β  and the retail sale demand is larger than direct sale demand. β  reflects the degree of 
18 
 
competition and migration rate between two channels. The higher is β , the higher is the 
competition degree between the two channels, the demands and prices increase for both 
channels and both the manufacturer and the retailer enjoy greater profits. The managerial 
guideline we obtain from here is that the manager should increase β  by channel collaboration 
and post-sales services (Chen et al., 2012). 
 
Fig.1 The change trend of prices withβ  under asymmetric information when the 
retailer’s cost state is high. 
 
Fig.2 The change trend of demands with β  under asymmetric information when the 




Fig.3 The change trend of prices withβ  under asymmetric information when the 
retailer’s cost state is low. 
 
Fig.4 The change trend of demand with β  under asymmetric information when the 
retailer’s cost state is low 
We also plot the profit difference as functions of β  and ρ as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 
respectively. Fig. 5 shows that the amount of profit increase for the manufacturer from 
asymmetric information to full information increased with β  is increasing. The amount of 
profit decrement for the retailer from asymmetric information to full information decreased 
with β  is increasing. It can be seen that in Fig.5 the manufacturer benefits from sharing 
information at the cost of retailer’s profit loss. With β  increasing, the higher is the 
competition degree between two channels, more profitable in dual-channel supply chain by 




Fig.5 The change trend of profit differences withβ  when retailer’s cost state is low 
From Section 3, we know that ρ  and (1 )ρ−  respectively represent the end 
customer’s preference for the direct channel and retail sale channel. From Fig. 6, we find that 
the profit difference for the manufacturer decreases with increasing ρ  from full information 
case to the asymmetric information case, while the profit difference increases for the retailer 
with increasing ρ  due to a negative profit difference from the full information case to the 
asymmetric information case. An important managerial insight obtained here is that the 
manufacturer can obtain a greater profit increment by sharing the retailer’s cost information 
when the end customer prefers to buy its products from a retail sale channel (1 )ρ− . The 
higher is the end customer’s preference (1 )ρ−  for the retail sale channel, the greater is the 
value of information sharing for the retailer and the greater the profits the retailer obtains 
from information asymmetry. Therefore, the manufacturer as a leader in a dual-channel 
supply chain should expand its market share of the direct channel and cultivate faithful 
customers that can effectively compensate any manufacturer’s reduction in profit due to 





Fig.6 The change trend of profit difference with ρ  when retailer’s cost state is low 
6. Conclusions 
Information asymmetry affects the decisions of the involved partners’ and always results in 
reduced performance in a traditional retail supply chain. This paper studies the optimal 
contract design problem in a dual-channel supply chain that consists of traditional retail 
channel and a direct sale channel. We examine a situation where the retailer’s cost is either 
high state or low state and where this information is private. A model has been developed to 
determine the manufacturer’s optimal decisions as a contract design problem. The 
closed-form expressions are derived under both the asymmetric information case and the full 
information case. In addition, the optimum decisions are contrasted between the asymmetric 
information case and the full information case. We analyse the effect of information 
asymmetry on the profits of each channel partner and quantify the value of information 
sharing. This study finds that information asymmetry imposes inefficiency on the 
manufacturer and the whole supply chain, while the retailer benefits from asymmetric 
information. Our findings show that, in the Internet era, it is beneficial to the manufacturer to 
actively pursue access to the retailer's private information by way of offering the retailer an 
incentive mechanism share this private information. The retailer may share its private 
information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up any 
reduction in the retailer’s profit.  
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This paper can be extended in several different directions, such as extending information 
asymmetry to a generalized case with continuous states rather than two-states as in our model. 
It may also be useful to consider some other contract menus and other kinds of demand 
function rather than the linear type adopted in our model. Another meaningful direction is to 
consider a dual-channel supply chain with multiple manufacturers or retailers under 
asymmetric information.  
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